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CALIFORNIA'S NEW HOUSEHOLD GOODS
EXEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
California is THE state in which to be a debtor or bankrupt.'
Even though the judgment creditor has the legal remedy of levying
against a debtor's property, 2 that right has been significantly limited.
The California legislature has made ample provision for the protec-
tion of the debtor's personal wealth by allowing a generous amount
of personal property to be exempt from levy of execution by cred-
itors.3 The principal exemption statutes in California are Code of
Civil Procedure sections 690 through 690.29,4 although many other
statutes provide for exemptions.5 The California debtor can retain a
sizeable amount of wealth while he remains indebted to others.
6 The
creditor who is without a perfected security interest must locate
property of the debtor which will be both subject to levy of execution
and valuable enough to provide a reasonable return at the sheriff's
sale to warrant the costs involved.
I "The bulk of the bankrupt's exemptions will be those allowed under the law of
the state in which the case is filed....
"The variations in laws between the states is considerable. If a debtor has a sub-
stantial amount of assets, he may find it to his advantage to move to California and
establish the necessary residence before filing bankruptcy, for that state is the most
generous to debtors." D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 589 at 326 (1963).
2 "The writ of execution must be issued in the name of the people, sealed with
the seal of the court, and subscribed by the clerk or judge, and be directed to the
sheriff, constable, or marshal, and it must intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating
the court ... where the judgment is entered, and if it be for money, the amount thereof,
and the amount actually due thereon ...and must require the officer to whom it is
directed to proceed substantially as follows:
1. Property or earnings of judgment debtor. If it be against the property of the
judgment debtor, it must require such officer to satisfy the judgment, with interest,
out of the personal property of such debtor ... and if sufficient personal property
cannot be found, then out of his real property .... ." CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE § 682 (West
Supp. 1971).
3 Id. §§ 690-690.29 (West Supp. 1971).
4 Id.
5 For example, Teachers' Retirement Fund deposits, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13808
(West Supp. 1971); property granted to public use, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31067 (West
1969) ; deposits in a credit union up to $1,500, CAL. FIN. CODE § 15406 (West 1968) ;
California Legislator's Retirement Fund deposits, CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 9359.3 (West
1966); California State Employee's Retirement Fund deposits, CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 21201
(West 1963) ; group life insurance policy payments, CAL. INS. CODE § 10213 (West
1955); insurance society and fraternal benefit society payments, CAL. INs. CODE § 11045
(West 1955).
6 The head of a family or a person 65 years of age or older can declare a home-
stead to the value of $20,000 above all liens and encumbrances on his dwelling, and all
other persons are allowed a homestead exemption of $10,000. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260(1,
3) (West Supp. 1971). If a homestead is not declared by the debtor or spouse, one
house trailer to a value of $5,000 above all liens and encumbrances is exempt. CAL.
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This comment will examine one section of the exemption provi-sions,' Code of Civil Procedure section 690.1.8 This section exemptsfrom levy of execution, upon the filing of a claim by the debtor,
Necessary household furnishings and appliances and wearing apparel,ordinarily and reasonably necessary to, and personally used by, thedebtor and his resident family, including, but not limited to, one piano;one radio and one television receiver; provisions and fuel actuallyprovided for the debtor and his resident family's use, sufficient for three
months; one shotgun and one rifle. Works of art shall not be exempt
unless of or by the debtor and his resident family.9
This provision was enacted in 1970 and greatly updates and modern-izes the similar provision which was then section 690.2.10 The new
code section removes outdated and nonfunctional provisions, suchas the specific exemption of stoves and stovepipes, cows and their
suckling calves and hogs and their suckling pigs. Even though it is
a significant improvement over the section which it replaces, the new
law is nevertheless inadequate.
Both the old and the new code sections exempt "necessary"furniture and wearing apparel." Neither provision explains what is
meant by that term. Both sections offer examples, but also requirejudicial interpretation. This vagueness is an unnecessary shortcom-ing in the statute and should be corrected by appropriate legislation.
Because the determination of the character, amount, and value
of the property to be exempt from levy is purely a question oflegislative policy,12 the exemption statutes should be written clearly
CIv. PRO. CODE § 690.3 (West Supp. 1971). Each person in the debtor's family maykeep up to $i,000 on deposit in any state or federal savings and loan association, CAL.CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.7 (West Supp. 1971).7 For broader discussions of exemption statutes, and several sound recommenda-tions for their modernization, see Abrahams & Feldman, The Exemption of Wages FromGarnishment: Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DE PAuL L. REV. 153 (1954);Gudgel, Debtor Exemptions in Personal Property-Proposals for Modernization, 52 Ky.L.J. 456 (1964); Joslin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND.L.J. 355 (1955); King, The Enforcement of Money Judgments in California, 11 S. CAL.L. REv. 224 (1938); Rifkind, Archaic Exemption Laws, 39 CALIF. S.B.J. 370 (1961).8 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
9 Id.10 The older version exempted "[n]ecessary household, table, and kitchen furniturebelonging to the judgment debtor, including one refrigerator, washing machine, sewingmachine, stove, stovepipes and furniture; wearing apparel, beds, bedding and bedsteads,hanging pictures, oil paintings and drawings drawn or painted by any member of thefamily, and family portraits and their necessary frames, provisions and fuel actuallyprovided for individual or family use, sufficient for three months, and three cows andtheir suckling calves, four hogs and their suckling pigs, and food for such cows andhogs for one month; also one radio, one television receiver, one piano, one shotgun andone rifle." Cal. Stats. 1935 ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935).11 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935), as amended, CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).12 Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 538, 53 P. 653 (1898) ; In re Klemp's Estate, 119Cal. 41, 50 P. 1062 (1897).
so as to provide maximum guidance to those responsible for their
implementation; as will be shown, judicial interpretation may lead
to unfair results. Case holdings on the household goods exemption
provisions have generally provided for a liberal interpretation of the
section for the benefit of the debtor.'" The problem is that the
pendulum may have swung a bit too far in the debtor's direction,
providing a result which is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the
granting of excessive amounts of personal property within the house-
hold goods exemption significantly reduces the effectiveness of the
creditor's legal remedy to execute against the personal property of
the debtor. Second, an unfair and perhaps unconstitutional judicial
discrimination between the rich and the poor debtor occurs when a
relatively wealthy debtor claims the benefits of the exemption stat-
utes. The wealthy debtor because of his wealth is allowed to retain
most of his personal belongings, including luxury items, but, by
contrast, no such protection is applicable to the poorer debtor. Two
recent holdings of a California Court of Appeal, discussed herein,
demonstrate this unequal application of the law.
4
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the shortcomings of
the newly revised household goods exemption statute and to suggest
legislation which will better accomplish the goal of protecting the
debtor from being denied the necessities of life by levying creditors.
The statute, however, should not operate to insulate the debtor from
his legal and moral obligations by making the creditor's enforcement
remedies ineffective.
First, the cases of Independence Bank v. Heller
15 and New-
port National Bank v. Adair'" will be discussed. They represent the
judicial interpretation of the household goods exemption which
produces the unsatisfactory results described above. Those cases
will then be analyzed in depth to determine if they represent sound
interpretations of the statute and the case law on which their con-
clusions are based. In an effort to identify the most effective method
of construction for exemption statutes, a discussion of the ap-
proaches that other jurisdictions have used will then be presented.
A proposed revision for California's household goods exemption
statute will follow. The proposed statute will clarify the amount of
property which will be exempt from levy and will alleviate the need
13 Haswell v. Parsons, 15 Cal. 266, 76 Am. Dec. 480 (1860); Los Angeles Fin. Co.
v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d 139 (1952) ; North British & Mercantile
Ins. Co. v. Ingalls, 109 Cal. App. 147, 292 P. 678 (1930).
14 Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969),
Newport Nat'l. Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
1 (1969).
15 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
16 2 Cal. App. 3d 1943, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
COMMENTS1972]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
for judicial interpretation. It will provide adequate protection to thedebtor without curtailing the effectiveness of the creditor's legal
remedies.
Two LIBERAL INTERPRETATIONS: Independence Bank v. Heller
and Newport National Bank v. Adair
In Independence Bank v. Heller,7 the plaintiff bank, which hadrecovered a judgment of $80,889.93 against defendant Heller, wasprecluded from levying execution against certain furnishings inHeller's Beverly Hills apartment. The value of the furnishings inquestion was in excess of $22,000.00. Heller claimed exemption forthe property as necessary household furnishings under the provisions
of Code of Civil Procedure section 690.2."8 The debtor's apartment
was tastefully furnished with many different pieces of furniture.The levy of execution was supervised by the bank's attorney, and
under his direction, the marshal left a refrigerator, chair, settee,coffee table, couch, rug, bed, bedding, a television set, and kitchenutensils. The seized property was inventoried and photographed and
amounted to about four hundred pieces. 9
The bank appealed the trial court's determination that the prop-erty claimed by Heller fell within the exemption law. The facts
were undisputed.2"
On appeal, the court recognized that there was no precedent onwhich to hold that a man who was unable to pay his debts should beallowed to remain ensconced in a luxuriously furnished apartment
and rely on the state exemption statutes in resisting the efforts ofhis creditors to collect their debts. Nevertheless, the court upheldthe determination of the lower court that nearly all of the propertyin question, which included a number of elaborately carved woodtables, sets of china, various styles and types of drinking glasses,
and serving dishes and platters, was exempt from levy of execution.2 1
In so holding, the court reasoned that Heller intended to paythe debt as soon as he was able, and that the purchase of the ex-empted furniture was not made for the purpose of putting assetsbeyond the reach of creditors. Relying on a presumption in favor ofhonest and fair dealing and against fraud, the court said that it wasnot incumbent upon the debtor to prove that he had honest inten-
17 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).18 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935), as amended, CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
19 275 Cal. App. 2d at 86, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (1969).20 Id.
21 Id.
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dons, since the bank had introduced no evidence to show that Heller
had acted with a fraudulent purpose.22
The court mentioned that it was the policy of California courts
to interpret exemption statutes liberally for the benefit of the debtor,
and cited three cases as authority. 23 The court then said,
Heller testified he is the son of wealthy parents, was reared and had
lived in an atmosphere of affluence and elegance which he has main-
tained in the furnishing of his apartment. This signifies that he is pos-
sessed of a desire to live in the midst of the finery to which he has be-
come accustomed....
It is well settled that in deciding whether furniture or wearing ap-
parel is necessary and should be exempted from execution the court
will consider the station in life of the owner and the manner of com-
fortable living to which he has become accustomed. . . . The rule fits
into section 690.2 which protects the ownership of some possessions
because of their artistic and cultural value as well as the things that are
necessary for physical use. It is of common knowledge that people who
take pride in their homes frequently furnish them with things that are
beautiful and elegant as well as useful such as several sets of china of
different patterns, a variety of crystal glasses of different styles and
tables and chairs in excess of the number that are indispensable.
The word 'necessary' as used in the statute should not be given
the meaning of indispensable.
2 4
The court said that this holding was not only for the benefit of
Heller, but for "all persons who furnish their homes in a manner far
above the average." 5 Rationalizing its new rule, the court suggested
that since "these are people who pay their bills and will not often be
found in court, claiming exemption of their furniture,... the [lower]
court could not . . . restrict Heller's right [to furnish his home with
luxuries] merely because he is apparently insolvent."
2
A judgment debtor's status per se, according to the Heller
decision, should not affect an individual's right to furnish his home
in a luxurious fashion, so long as the judgment creditor brings forth
no evidence to show that the debtor was attempting to put his assets
beyond the reach of creditors. The court attaches very little impor-
tance to the fact of the debtor's insolvency, but protects the debtor's
right to add to the essentials of an adequately furnished home.
This case was followed later in the same year by another divi-
sion of the same court. Newport National Bank v. Adair
" held that
22 Id. at 87, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
23 Id. at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 870. See also cases cited note 13, supra.
24 275 Cal. App. 2d at 87, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (1969).
25 Id. at 89, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
26 Id.
27 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
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a judgment debtor whose furniture was appropriate to furnish afourteen room home in fashionable Hillsborough, California, which
rented for $1,250.00 per month, was exempt from levy. The debtor's
claim of exemption stated that the furniture was necessary within
the meaning of the statute28 because it was used by the debtor, his
wife and family, "in their normal, usual, and customary station inlife. 1 2 9 The debtor, a self-employed financial agent, had been earn-ing between $40,000 and $50,000 per year in recent years. His home
was the base of his activities, and he occasionally entertained
clients there. He did not, however, claim any of the furniture inquestion under the tools of the trade exemption statute 0
The Newport Bank argued that the test of what is necessary tothe judgment debtor should be determined in light of the standard
of living that would be reasonable for a judgment debtor rather than
the standard 9f living which was enjoyed before becoming a judg-
ment debtor. The court disregarded this argument, allowing the
exemptions.
The court relied on Heller,8 and on a report of the committee
of the State Bar of California which had investigated the California
exemption statutes. 2 The committee report suggested that "items
which are necessary for the care and maintenance of the debtor orhis family should be exempt regardless of their value."88 Since thelegislature had not placed a dollar amount on the exemption provi-
sion, the court followed the test which was set forth in Heller, thatfurniture is necessary if it is appropriate to the "station in life of the
owner and the manner of comfortable living to which he has become
accustomed." 4 The court concluded by saying that "[p]laintiff's
complaints about the alleged injustice of a judgment debtor's livingin luxury when he owes money should be addressed to the Legisla-
ture and not to the courts.""8
28 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935), as amended, CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE
§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
29 2 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 2 (1969).
50 See CAL. CrV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1971).31 Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).82 2 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 2 (1969) ; Committee on Debtor andCreditor, Modernization of Statutory Exemptions, 42 CALIF. S.B.J. 869 (1967).33 42 CALIF. S.B.J. at 875. The committee report stressed the difficulties involvedin making valuations on certain property and suggested that the exemption statutewould be more effective if items rather than their value were at issue. The committee
overlooked the problem of quantity, however. In Heller there were over 400 items atissue, clearly in excess of the debtor's needs. In Adair, the issue was whether pieces offurniture sufficient to complement a fourteen room home were properly exempt. Thesecases present problems which the committee might have failed to envision.34 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 1046, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1969).
35 Id.
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EVALUATION OF THE HELLER RATIONALE
These two cases illustrate that the exemption provision as
enacted by the legislature provides no clear standard for judicial
interpretation. The central argument in Heller
6 is based neither upon
the code section itself nor upon prior case holdings, but rather upon
a new rule which the court creates to justify the holding. The rule
is that the property of the debtor is exempt if it was purchased 
by
the debtor for an honest and forthright purpose-this is presumed-
and not for the purpose of placing assets beyond the 
reach of
creditors. The rule misses the point of the exemption 
provisions.
The intent with which the property was purchased is not important.
What matters is whether the property is necessary to maintain a 
basic
standard of living."
The court in Heller cites several cases as authority for the 
prop-
osition that exemption statutes should be liberally interpreted 
for
the benefit of the debtor
3 8 However, these cases do not support the
conclusions reached by the court, as will be shown below.
In Haswell v. Parsons,
3 9 the court held that the exemption
statute should not be so strictly read as to exempt 
only the number
of beds which would be in constant use by the debtor 
and his family.
The court upheld exemptions for six or seven beds, the 
total value
of which was $128. The debtor was a farmer in Yuba County 
and
lived with his wife and three children in a sparsely 
furnished build-
ing which had once been a hotel.
In North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Ingalls,
40 the court
allowed an exemption for the debtor's widow by granting 
that certain
proceeds from a life insurance policy, which would not 
be exempt
for the debtor himself, were exempt for the beneficiary, 
since she
was a stranger to the indebtedness. The Ingalls holding 
relied
heavily on Holmes v. Marshall,
4 which explained the policy behind
the liberal interpretation of exemption statutes for the benefit 
of the
debtor.4 2
36 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
37 Perfection Paint Prod. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 330 P.2d 829 
(1958).
38 See cases cited, note 13, supra.
39 15 Cal. 266, 76 Am. Dec. 480 (1860).
40 109 Cal. App. 147, 292 P. 678 (1930).
41 145 Cal. 777, 79 P. 534 (1905).
42 "Statutes exempting property from execution are enacted on the ground 
of pub-
lic policy for the benevolent purpose of saving debtors and 
their families from want
by reason of misfortune or improvidence. The general 
rule now is to construe such
statutes liberally, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature, 
and the humane
purpose designated by the lawmakers." 145 Cal. at 778-79, 79 P. 
at 535 (1905).
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In Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores,43 the court recognized thatthe word "necessary" could have various meanings and applications
and should be applied to the facts of a case to carry out the intentof the legislature. The court ruled against a debtor who had claimed
exemption of the full amount of his wages. The statute provided forexemption of the wages if necessary to the debtor to provide for
"the common necessaries of life" for himself and his family." Thedebtor had purchased a watch on credit and had defaulted. The cred-itor garnished his wages, applying the money to the purchase price.The court held that because the watch was neither necessary norpractical for the debtor to wear in his work, his wages could not beconsidered exempt with respect to the purchase of the watch. Thecourt recognized that the statutes would be liberally interpreted forthe benefit of the debtor, but held that the debtor in the present casedid not qualify for such an interpretation.*"
These cases provide little authority for the holding in Hellerthat over $22,000.00 worth of admittedly non-essential furnishings
should be exempt from levy by a judgment creditor. Rather, they areholdings which merely protect the debtor from an interpretation ofthe statute which would be too harsh or unfair in the individualdebtor's case. As will be shown below, the weight of authoritywould support a much less generous interpretation. The cases requirethat the debtor bear the burden of proof that the items claimed forexemption are necessary to his use.46 They also require that thedebtor bring himself within the spirit of the exemption laws.4" Theyhold that what is exempt is often a function of the debtor's individ-ual station in life, which includes his status as a debtor per se, but
not necessarily social status. 8
The "station in life" test which the Heller court used was firstmentioned in Estate of Millington."a However, Millington is shallow
support for the conclusions reached by the Heller court which allowthe debtor to remain ensconced in luxury even though insolvent.
The Millington case involves an interpretation of what isnecessary wearing apparel, and provides a helpful parallel for decid-ing what is necessary household furniture. Millington states:
43 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d 139 (1952).44 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 20, at 1970 (1935), as amended, CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE§ 690.11 (West Supp. 1971).
45 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 856, 243 P.2d at 144 (1952).46 Murphy v. Harris, 77 Cal. 194, 19 P. 377 (1888). See also, CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE§ 690.50(i) (West Supp. 1971).
47 Bertozzi v. Swisher, 27 Cal. App. 2d 741, 745, 81 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1939).48 Estate of Millington, 63 Cal. App. 498, 505, 218 P. 1022, 1025 (1923).49 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 P. 1022 (1923).
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The statute expressly makes distinctions in the exemption of property
from execution, based on the occupation or calling of the debtor, but
beyond such express provisions, there can be no distinction based upon
the previous financial condition and social station of the insolvent
debtor; otherwise the statute would operate unequally between the
rich and poor.50
The court uses a "station in life" test as a means of determin-
ing whether a certain article of clothing would be considered neces-
sary, and explains that "[i]n determining whether any article of
apparel claimed to be exempt by a debtor is necessary for his use,
it would seem logical to inquire whether it is reasonable and proper
for use in the home and in social intercourse in view of the debtor's
insolvency."'" This point is ignored in Heller. Where the Heller
court says that the previous social condition of the debtor is justifi-
cation for a liberal interpretation of the statute, Millington states:
[T]he previous financial condition and social station of the debtor may
properly be considered in determining whether the article sought to be
exempted was acquired in good faith for the purpose for which the ex-
emption is claimed, or for the purpose of defrauding creditors in con-
templation of insolvency, but beyond this it is not conceived that they
are material factors.52
Millington further limits the "station in life" test by explaining that
"[t] he purpose of the exemption laws is to save debtors and their
families from want, not to enable them to wear luxurious ornaments
at the expense of their creditors.""3
The parallel between the Heller case and the Millington case
is clear. Where luxurious ornaments of wearing apparel should not
be exempt, neither should admittedly non-essential pieces of house-
hold furnishings. The debtor's status as debtor should not be disre-
garded; the social status of the individual before he became a debtor
is material only as evidence that he may not have purchased the
items to defraud his creditors. The purpose of the exemption laws is
to protect the debtor from losing the necessary appurtenances of
life,54 but not to maintain a lavishly furnished apartment, nor to
wear luxurious ornaments while indebted to others.
In Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores,55 a case which Heller
uses as authority for the "station in life" argument, the court states:
50 Id. at 502, 218 P. at 1023.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 502, 218 P. at 1024 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 504, 218 P. at 1025.
54 Perfection Paint Prod. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742, 330 P.2d 829,
831 (1958).
55 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d 139 (1952).
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Necessary wearing apparel, as used in Code of Civil Procedure, section690.2, under the decisions, means necessary to the particular debtor
considering all circumstances-his station in life, his particular type of
employment, etc. . . .A tuxedo may be necessary wearing apparel to
a waiter at a top notch cafe, but not to a laborer ...."56
"Station in life," then, refers to a particular need or occupation,
not to social status. This indicates that a liberal interpretation
should be given to the exemption statutes to assure that clothing
which may be of special need to a debtor in earning his living
would be exempt, but it certainly does not say that social status
should be considered so that once one has accumulated a large
quantity of luxurious furniture he therefore has a right to be un-
disturbed in his comforts, even when he is unable to pay his bills.
Heller's furniture probably could not reasonably be classified
as necessary to his particular occupation. Even though he was an
interior decorator, he did not claim any of the furniture under the
tools of the trade exemption as he might have done.57 Interior
decorators normally conduct their business on the premises to be
decorated, or often consult with clients in an office or furniture
store. The furnishings in the decorator's own home would very
seldom have any relevance to the decorating problems of an individ-
ual client.
It might be argued that the necessary household goods exemp-
tion should be interpreted in light of the occupational needs of the
debtor even where he does not claim the property under the specific
tools of the trade exemption. The policy of the court should rightly
be designed to protect the debtor who demonstrates a real need for
a particular exemption. In the Heller59 case, however, the debtor
was not in need of court protection. He was a man living in comfort,
even though insolvent.
The court misread the statute when it held that "[h]anging
pictures, drawings, paintings . ..are included as household furni-
ture not because they are suitable for physical use but because they
contribute to the pleasure and comfort of the owner and perhaps
his pride of ownership."' 0 The court seems to place great importance
on the aesthetic and decorative adjuncts to the debtor's condition.
In fact, the statute provides only for the exemption of family art,
56 Id. at 856, 243 P.2d at 143.
57 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1971).
58 Telephone interview, December 21, 1971 with Mrs. Rhodes, interior decorator,
Breuners furniture store, 525 East Hamilton, Campbell, California.
59 Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
60 Id. at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
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not art per se.61 Pictures of the family or paintings done by the
debtor himself are likely to have great sentimental value and proba-
bly little commercial value. The 1970 version of the exemption
statute more clearly expresses the exemption, but it is nevertheless
discernable in the older version." There is case authority which so
holds. In Hamaker v. Heffron,63 the court held that oil paintings
which were not shown to be family portraits nor painted by a mem-
ber of the family were not exempt.
The legislature did not intend that items should be considered
necessary if they were decorative only.64 Such an interpretation
would not be easy to support, as can be seen when reading other
sections of the exemption provisions. For example, the automobile
of the debtor is exempt only if it is worth not more than $1,000 and
the debtor's equity is not greater than $350.65 The value of com-
mercial equipment and tools of the trade exempted is limited to
$2,500.66 A conclusion that the legislature intended that luxurious
furnishings should be included within the meaning of necessary
household furnishings would hardly be reasonable when the exemp-
tion provisions are read as a whole.67
The court in Heller creates an invalid dichotomy when it states,
"[t]he word 'necessary' as used in the statute should not be given
the meaning of indispensable."68 This reasoning suggests that there
is no middle ground between luxury items and indispensable items.
With the exception of Heller and Adair, the cases mentioned above
are ample evidence that the courts can determine the amount of
property which would be reasonable under the exemption provision.
Next in its analysis the Heller court refers to a "rule" under
which the courts "give consideration" to the custom of some persons
to embellish their homes by "adding to the bare essentials articles
which they consider necessary to their pleasure, convenience, and
comfort."69 The court cited no authority which would suggest that
such a rule had been recognized in the past. No court has held that
what the debtor considers necessary to his pleasure, convenience,
and comfort is necessarily controlling in determining whether certain
property is exempt. Perhaps courts might reasonably "give consid-
61 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935), as amended, CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
02 Id.
63 148 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 737 (1949).
4 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
65 Id. § 690.2.
66 Id. § 690.4.
67 Id. §§ 690-690.29.
68 275 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (1969).
69 Id.
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eration" to the debtor's personal customs and habits, but certainly
the court should not be bound by them. The determination the court
must make is necessarily a subjective evaluation of what is ordinar-ily and reasonably necessary to the use of the debtor. Mr. Heller's
furniture requirements would more appropriately be described as
extravagant than necessary. The only case authority for the Heller
rule might be the cases which suggest a liberal interpretation infavor of the debtor to insure effective compliance with the intent of
the statute. As was shown above, however, those cases work to avoid
hardships rather than to preserve a luxurious standard of living.7"
The most disturbing aspect of the court's new rule of recogniz-ing this act of "adding to the bare essentials" is that the court
elevates this practice to the status of a right which the court feels
obligated to protect. The court feels that "[a] 11 persons who furnish
their homes in a manner far above the average' would be left un-protected without this judicial assistance. This notion of the courtin Heller disregards the impact of the decision on the creditor. Asprecedent, this case effectively could be used to exempt almost allpersonal property which a debtor feels he would like to keep to re-
main comfortable. Having no fear that a creditor might deprive him
of the comforts and pleasures of life, the debtor becomes insulatedfrom personal accountabilty for his debts. Such a diminution of the
creditor's leverage over the debtor increases the risk of loss. This
risk increases the cost of credit, a cost which is almost inevitably
passed on to the consumer. Thus, the attempt of the Heller court toprotect the debtor can actually work against the debtor's best
interests.
The Heller decision also represents judicial enforcement ofinvidious social discrimination. Innocent on its face, the holding in
reality works unfairly against the poor. Under Heller, a rich man cankeep his wealth merely by showing that he was wealthy before hebecame indebted to the levying creditor. The poor man, however,
who has very little in the way of worldly goods would likely lose
anything which might be inconsistent with his basic life style. A rich
man could keep a Picasso drawing worth thousands of dollars be-
cause it brought him pleasure and was a tasteful addition to abeautifully furnished home. A poor man, who might be an art loverbut lives in modest surroundings, would undoubtedly lose such an
extravagant possession. The drawing might actually have much more
meaning to the poor man because of its special prominence in an
otherwise drab environment, but because the poor man would be
70 See cases cited note 13, supra.
71 275 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (1969).
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unable to prove that the drawing fits in with his life style, it would
not be exempt. Likewise, the more profligate spender who furnished
his home with many luxury items would fare much better than the
prudent man who spent his money on tools of his trade. He would be
limited to only $2,500 worth of tools,7 2 while the luxurious furnish-
ings would remain exempt. Such unequal application of the law to
the same class of citizen, i.e. the judgment debtor, is subject to
question under the fourteenth amendment.
73
The Supreme Court has recognized that statutes which make
discriminatory classifications based on wealth are suspect and re-
quire careful scrutiny by the Court to insure that they are not in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. 74 The Court decided over
twenty years ago that a court decision could be considered state
action and thus within the purview of the fourteenth amendment.75
A growing body of law under the equal protection clause to the
fourteenth amendment has come to treat the unequal impact of
certain state activities because of a citizen's individual wealth, or
lack of wealth, as invidious discrimination which the amendment
forbids.76 Judgment debtors, whether rich or poor, are entitled to
the equal protection of laws equally enforced, and the Heller doc-
trine cannot be reconciled with that requirement.
Newport National Bank v. Adair77 closely follows the reasoning
and parallels the results in Heller. It directly refutes the holding in
Estate of Millington,"' a case which emphasized that the status of
judgment debtor is to be strongly considered in interpreting the
statute.79 Adair is significant only because it represents an affirma-
tion of the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the Heller
court.
EXEMPTION STATUTES: DESIGN AND POLICY
Because the statute which exempts necessary household fur-
nishings and wearing apparel, even in its newly revised form, is
72 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1971).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
74 See generally Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
75 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
76 Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
HARV. L. REV. 435 (1967). This note discusses recent Supreme Court holdings invalidat-
ing state laws which effectively denied poor criminal defendants certain state services,
such as reproduction of the transcripts of their trials, which were available to defend-
ants who had money to pay the required fees.
77 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
78 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 P. 1022 (1923).
79 See text accompanying notes 53-54, supra.
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inadequate to preclude further holdings such as Heller and Adair,
section 690.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure"° should be rewritten
so as to better effect the legislative intent. Exemption provisions are
purely matters of legislative policy,81 and should be written effec-
tively so as to carry out that policy.
Exemption statutes in California are of three basic types. Those
which exempt specific items, 2 those which give specific dollar
exemptions,' and those which combine an item description with a
dollar limitation. 4
Statutes which name specific items give the greatest guidance
to the levying officer. However, they can be unworkable when they
employ broadly inclusive terms such as household goods. Specific
mention of items can be helpful to the sheriff, for he knows that he
cannot take the California debtor's piano, television set, shotgun,
radio, or rifle. Those which give specific dollar exemptions are also
clear. A look at the debtor's bank accounts will identify any non-
exempt moneys. The combination provisions give maximum flexibil-
ity but involve the problems of the other types of statutes. Will
retail, wholesale, or replacement value be used?85 The sheriff has
the burden of assessing the value, regardless of which standard is
used. This type of provision allows the debtor to choose which itemshe would like to claim as exempt, possibly avoiding an unfair result.
For example, the debtor under the tools of the trade exemption
would be allowed to pick the tools he considers most valuable to him,
up to the $2,500.00 limitation.8
The various states have devised many approaches to achieving
the goals of the exemption statutes. 8T The federal government has
80 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
81 Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 538, 53 P. 653, 654 (1898) ; In re Klemp, 119
Cal. 41, 43, 50 P. 1062, 1063 (1897).
"Debtors have, of course, no common law or inherent right to exemptions, home-
steads, or to withhold any of their property from levy by their creditors. . . . The
exemptions and the homestead provisions are an attempt on the part of the legislature
to reconcile the rights between creditor and debtor consistent with providing a modesthome for the debtor and his family and the basic tools or equipment to enable him to
earn a living for his family so as not to become a charge upon society." Rifkin, Archaic
Exemption Laws, 39 CALIF. S.B.J. 370 (1964).
82 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 690.5, 690.29 (West Supp. 1971).
83 Id. § 690.7.
84 Id. §§ 690.2-4.
85 "[T]he word 'value,' when not qualified by context or circumstances, has often
been defined as meaning 'market value,' which is not what the owner could have realized
at a forced sale, but the price he could obtain after reasonable and ample time ... "
Wade v. Rathbun, 23 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 758, 760, 67 P.2d 765, 766 (1937).86 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1971).
87 For example, Michigan limits its household goods exemption to a maximum of$1,000 worth of furniture, utensils, books, and appliances. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
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also provided exemptions for the tax debtor18 The Internal Revenue
Code describes the property exempt from levy as necessary wearing
apparel, school books for the taxpayer and his family, fuel and
provisions, and furniture and personal effects to a value of $500.9
To solve the problem of valuation, the Code directs the Secretary or
his delegate to summon three disinterested persons who will make
the valuation.9" Finally, the section provides that no property or
rights to property other than those which are specifically mentioned
in the provision will be exempt.9'
Congress has decided to limit the exemptions for tax debtors
to a small and exclusive list of items, while the states have generally
taken a less severe approach. Perhaps Congress feels that the
federal government's interest in quick and efficient settlement of tax
claims is of greater importance than the debtor's comfort. The state
laws, on the other hand, reflect a greater concern for the individual
debtor. The vested interest that the federal government is protecting
in its exemption provisions is missing in the state setting. Moreover,
the individual states must frequently bear the heavy cost of support
for its indigents.
In general, federal and state exemption provisions are less
generous than the California exemption laws. They represent a
determination on the part of the various state legislatures and the
Congress that certain necessary items should be exempt from levy.
They certainly do not indicate that the debtor is to be granted
immunity from the loss of items which are not necessary to the
maintenance of a modest standard of living.
A RECOMMENDED STATUTE
In view of the inadequacy of the present exemption provision as
discussed above, the following revision of Code of Civil Procedure
§ 600.6023 (1968) ; A basic estate of $2,000 is allowed in Virginia, and in addition, all
necessary wearing apparel, the family Bible, and pictures, etc. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26
(1970) ; The State of Washington exempts all of the wearing apparel of each member
of the family, the family library to the extent of $500, and beds, bedding, and furnish-
ings to the value of $500. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.16.020 (Supp. 1971). Wisconsin
exempts the family Bible, school books, and family pictures; it also limits the amount
of wearing apparel to a value of $400 and household goods and cooking utensils to only
$200. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 272.18 (1958). In Indiana, exemption laws are required as a
matter of constitutional law: "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary com-
forts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of
property from seizure or sale for the payment of a debt . . . ." IND. CONST. art. I § 22.
88 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6334.
89 Id.
9o Id.
91 Id.
19721
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
690.1 is suggested. The property mentioned below would be exempt
from execution:
690.1 Necessary Household Furnishings, Wearing Apparel,
Family Art
(a) Necessary household furnishings and appliances ordi-
narily and reasonably used by the debtor and his resident family,
not to exceed $2,500.00 in value. Single items which would
reasonably be expected to provide a high return at an execution
sale shall not be exempt unless claimed by the debtor to be a
family keepsake. Claim for such exemption is to be made accord-
ing to the provisions of section 690.50.
(b) Necessary wearing apparel ordinarily and reasonably
used by the debtor and his resident family, not to exceed $500.00
in value for each member of the resident family. Single items
such as jewelry, fur coats, and watches, in excess of $100.00 in
value, shall not be exempt unless claimed by the debtor to be afamily keepsake. Claim for such exemption is to be made accord-
ing to the provisions of section 690.50.
(c) Works of art shall not be exempt within section (a)
unless of or by the debtor or his family. If the debtor or family
artist sells his paintings or drawings as his primary occupation,
however, only paintings of the family shall be exempt.
(d) The value of items claimed to be exempt will be mea-
sured by normal market retail price. Items will be assessed in
value in their present condition, not by replacement cost or value
when they were purchased. Disagreements as to valuation of
specific items will be resolved as provided in section 690.50.
The above provision uses the combination approach of listing
the type of items to be exempt, but limiting the total exemption by a
dollar amount. As discussed above, this approach offers the greatest
degree of flexibility while giving adequate guidance to those respon-
sible for implementation and enforcement. The provisions of thepresent statute name the types of items to be exempt but omit a
dollar limitation. The Heller and Adair cases illustrate the inappro-
priate results which are possible with such a statutory flaw. The
proposed section will preclude such holdings.
Since used furniture and clothing seldom command the price
originally paid, most of the furnishings and clothing of the average
debtor should be protected by the suggested provision. The expensive
individual items such as color television sets, pianos, and stereophonograph systems should be subject to execution. These are
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luxury items which the debtor should be expected to forgo when he
is unable to pay his bills. Basic standards of fairness demand that
the creditor have access to an effective legal remedy to enforce his
judgment. Precluding the exemption of luxury items can hardly be
considered unfair to the debtor.
The proposed statute provides an exception for the family keep-
sake, not presently available, which might be a valuable antique. In
such case, the debtor may make a claim for the exemption as pro-
vided for in section 690.50.92 The burden of proof is on the debtor
to convince the court that the item is a family heirloom or keepsake.
An item which has been handed down through the generations should
rightly be exempt, even though it may possibly bring a high return
at an execution sale. An antique purchased by an extravagant debtor
should be leviable.
Works of art should not be leviable if they are family portraits
or works of the amateur family member. In all likelihood they would
provide a modest return at an execution sale. A professional artist or
photographer, however, should not enjoy an exemption that those in
other businesses would not be allowed. A typical merchant's inven-
tory is leviable; so should the artist's stock on hand. If the debtor
makes it his business to sell his creations in the market, he should
not be entitled to preferential treatment. If he has sold his works in
the past and has his works on sale at the time of levy, he should not
be heard to complain of their sale to satisfy his indebtedness.
CONCLUSION
The recommended statute will not be the panacea for all exemp-
tion problems. With time, the dollar amount will possibly have to be
revalued to offer the same degree of protection. The debtor is still
required to pick and choose which items he will claim as exempt and
which items he will release to the levying officer for sale at auction.
The purpose of the exemption statutes is not to avoid all unpleasant-
ness which results from one's insolvency. The new section suggested
herein would, however, avoid the inequalities inherent in the present
code section. The Mr. Hellers and Mr. Adairs would be specifically
limited in the amount of personal property they might keep under
the exemption provisions, regardless of their present or past social
status, station in life, or standard of living.
The law should be written and enforced to promote maximum
fairness to both debtor and creditor. The law should not be written
92 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.50 (West Supp. 1971).
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so as to protect those who lend money or extend credit for profitfrom the risks of enterprise. The law is rightly invoked to protect
the debtor from want due to improvidence or misfortune. However,
the law should not be invoked so as to shield the debtor from per-
sonal accountability to his creditors while he enjoys the pleasures
and comforts of wealth that are purely apparent.
Daniel H. Dahlen
